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The crisis of the Chinese nation in the early twentieth century compelled May 
Fourth intellectuals to search for a modern self in order to modernize and strengthen the 
nation. They did so by self-consciously experimenting with literary forms and genres, from 
which the first-person narratives arose. This thesis explores how particular formal or 
generic characteristics produce, problematize, or even impede the formation of a modern 
self modeled on the Western Enlightenment notions of the self as autonomous, coherent, 
and bounded. I argue that despite the two authors’ attempt to create an aspirational modern 
self, the selves constructed in the two texts are always fragile, split and fragmented. It not 
only reveals the limits of the Western Enlightenment epistemology of the self but also a 
more complicated processes of how the concepts of the self and subjectivity, as discursive 
constructs, are contested and negotiated in particular historical circumstance and social 
reality. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: DEFINING, THEORIZING, AND PROBLEMATIZING 
SUBJECTIVITY, SELF, AND THEIR RELATIONS TO 
LITERARY FORM 
 The use of first-person singular was not a modern invention. Many literary scholars in 
the China field have confirmed that autobiographical writings existed in traditional China;1 
some view Sima Qian’s “The Self-Narration of the Senior Archivist” 太史公自序 as the 
earliest known autobiographical writing in Chinese literary history. Wendy Larson, for 
instance, in the prelude to her study of modern Chinese autobiographies, categorizes “The 
Self-Narration” as a “prototypical autobiography.”2 However, unlike a typical Western 
autobiography or novel that begins with the birth of the protagonist, such as David 
Copperfield, Sima Qian’s name in fact does not appear until several pages into the text. 
Instead he first narrates at great length his family genealogy and history, particularly their 
positions as state scribe and archivist, his father Sima Tian, and the training and education 
Tian has received; he even faithfully reproduces an essay written by Sima Tian on Six 
Schools (liujia 六家). As Larson points out, the self which Sima Qian constructs in “The 
Self-Narration” takes its meaning and authority in the duty of transmission and other eternal 
elements such as the Feng and Shan Sacrifice and reordering of the celestial calendar.3 Such a 
self is always defined and positioned “in relation to eternal phenomena, social structures and 
                                                 
1 A prominent example is Wu Pei-Yi’s pioneering study of premodern Chinese autobiographical writings by male authors in 
The Confucian’s Progress: Autobiographical Writings in Traditional China (1990). 
2 See Wendy Larson, Literary Authority and the Modern Chinese Writer: Ambivalence and Autobiography (1991). Yi-tsi 
Mei Feuerwerker echoes Larson’s observation in the introduction chapter in her monograph Ideology, Power, Text: Self-
Representation and the Peasant “Other” in Modern Chinese Literature (1998).  
3 For a detailed discussion of transmitting historical records and its relation to textual authority, see Stephen Durrant “Truth 
Claims in Shiji” in Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Achim Mittag and Jörn Ru ̈ sen eds. Historical Truth, Historical Criticism, and 
Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Comparative Perspective. 2005. 
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institutions, and political ideology” (Larson 1991, 16). To summarize, the type of self in Sima 
Qian’s “The Self-Narration” is completely situated in contexts and defined by its relations 
and duties to external institutions (family in particular) and textual traditions.  
  What was a modern invention was to use “I” (wo) to construct a new type of self 
unbounded by traditions and filial obligations, a coherent and autonomous modern self that 
May Fourth intellectuals aspired to.4 The publication of Lu Xun’s “Diary of a Madman” 
(Kuangren riji) in 1918 was probably the first step toward that construction. It has long been 
recognized as the first example of modern Chinese vernacular (baihua) fiction and marker of 
Chinese literary modernity.5 Along with the subsequent proliferation of first-person 
narratives in the May Fourth era, there began an entire generation of intellectuals’ intense 
interests in the individual and modern self. May Fourth intellectuals were inexhaustibly 
questioning what it meant to be modern and endeavoring to conceive a modern self by self-
consciously experimenting with forms and genres. This thesis chooses two canonical first-
person narratives, Lu Xun’s “In Memoriam” 傷逝 (1925) and Ding Ling’s “Miss Sophia’s 
Diary” 莎菲女士的日記 (1927), as most representative of such endeavors of their era.  
                                                 
4 This type of self will sometimes be termed as “an aspirational modern self” later in this thesis. It particularly refers to a 
kind of self modeled on Western Enlightenment notions of the self as autonomous, coherent, independent, possessive, etc. 
Yet as this thesis argues, that attempt to discursively create a modern self s never achieved.   
5 Later literary historians discovered that another vernacular short story, “One Day” (Yiri), by Chen Hengzhe, a female writer 
studying in the Vassar College in the United States, was published almost a year earlier. It first appeared in the journal 
Students Abroad in America Quarterly (Liumei xuesheng jikan), edited by Hu Shi and published in the United States. For a 
detailed discussion of Chen Hengzhe’s short story, see chapter one in Janet Ng’s The Experience of Modernity: Chinese 
Autobiography of the Early Twentieth Century.  
I am highly aware of the contested idea of “modernity” and the controversies surrounding the question of when Chinese 
literary modernity began. Some scholars may identify Ming urban centers as the places where modernity occurred and point 
to Ming and Qing vernacular fictions (the huaben genre) as manifestations of literary modernity. More often literary scholars 
may regard the late-Qing period as the inception of modern literature. I, however, follow the convention that recognizes the 
New Culture Movement as the beginning of a new era because of the most fundamental self-induced transformation in the 
very form and medium by which literature was constituted. In other words there had never been a more self-conscious break 
from the past, innovations of literary forms, and creations of epistemological disjunction before the May Fourth era. My 
definition of the term modern reflects the self-conscious, always self-reflexive nature of the term as used in May Fourth 
literature texts in general. The difficulty of periodization is that there always remains some cultural residual in any emergent 
era, and thus any demarcations of “tradition” and “modernity” have various limits and always remain inadequate.  
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  The two texts were also chosen for their formal and generic complexities that have 
been ignored by many literary scholars in the field. The two texts are fictionalized first-
person narratives presented in the form of personal notes and a diary. Why did these two 
authors employ these multiply mediated forms rather than tell a straightforward story? What 
functions does a diary perform that cannot be accomplished by any other forms? What textual 
and cultural functions does the first-person singular “I,” a presumably optimal site to 
construct self and subjectivity, perform? Even though selfhood and subjectivity in modern 
Chinese literature is a much-discussed topic, little attention has been directed to the very 
medium that creates subjectivity, i.e. language.6 Fewer have paid close attention to the 
intrinsic formal and generic mechanisms of literary texts. It is my intention to point out that 
mediation, or the form of the work of art, matters. Mediation, according to Adorno, is 
absolutely necessary for the work of art to exist and function outside of social reality.7  
  Thus instead of viewing literature simply as representations of the self and social 
reality, this thesis explores how particular formal or generic characteristics produce, 
problematize, or even impede the formation of a coherent and autonomous modern self 
modeled on Western Enlightenment thinking.8 Through my close readings of the two texts, it 
is my contention that despite the two authors’ attempt to create an aspirational modern male 
                                                 
6 I am evoking French linguist Emile Benveniste’s classic formulation on the relation between language and subjectivity that 
“it is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject” (221), a formulation I will rely on to perform literary 
analysis. The only existing scholarship that discusses first-person narratives from a linguistic perspective is the sixth chapter 
“The Deixis of Writing in the First Person” in Lydia H. Liu’s Translingual Practice. However even as Lydia Liu briefly 
evokes Emile Benveniste’s linguistic theory that it is through language that a subject is constituted, her consequent reading 
of “Miss Sophia’s Diary” focuses more on writing and reading as a gendered act and thus fails to fully engage with 
Benveniste’s theory and the function of a “I” discourse. 
7 See Theodor Adorno, “Commitment,” New Left Review I 87-88 (1974): p. 80. Adorno elucidates the dialectic relation 
between the work of art and social reality: it obeys the rules of social reality and maintains distance from it. That distance is 
the form of the work of art; the form mediates between art and social reality and guarantees the autonomy of art. 
8 I agree with Vera Schwarcz’s main contention that the May Fourth Movement was the enlightenment movement of China 
for its iconoclastic stance, its interests in and celebration of Western Enlightenment values such as democracy and equality, 
and etc. See Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 
(1986). 
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and female self, the selves constructed in the two texts are always fragile, split and 
fragmented. It not only reveals the limits of the Western Enlightenment epistemology of the 
self but also exposes a more complicated processes of how the concepts of the self and 
subjectivity, as discursive constructs, are contested and negotiated in particular historical 
circumstances and social reality. A recourse to defining what a Western Enlightenment 
epistemology of the self is seems now necessary before I turn to the polyvalent formal and 
aesthetic innovations of May Fourth writers and form’s dialectic relations to social reality. 
This task involves working out the semantic meaning(s) as well as history of contested ideas 
such as subjectivity, individuality, and individualism in their original contexts. The first step 
of this introduction chapter then is to achieve a certain degree of construction after numerous 
genealogical deconstructions.9    
  Decades ago Jaroslav Průšek in The Lyrical and the Epic already captured the 
subjective and individualistic feature of the May Fourth literature: “There can be no question 
that subjectivism and individualism, joined with pessimism and a feeling for the tragedy of 
life, along with an inclination to revolt and even the tendency to self-destruction, are the most 
characteristic qualities of Chinese literature from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to the 
outbreak of war with Japan” (3). Even though Průšek later was criticized for interpreting 
Chinese literature through the lens of a Euro-American literary standard that privileged 
subjectivity, his foregrounding of subjectivism and individualism nevertheless had significant 
impact on later studies of modern Chinese literature, especially of the May Fourth literature.10  
                                                 
9 An entire generation of literary scholars in the China field trained in poststructuralism devoted their works to genealogical 
studies of an idea or cultural phenomenon. Some typical works include Lydia H. Liu’s Translingual Practice (1995), and 
Haiyan Lee’s Revolution of the Heart: A Genealogy of Love in China, 1900-1950 (2007).    
10 Theodore Huters later gives a clearer definition of Průšek’s “subjectivity” as “interiority.” He conceives “narrative 
interiority” as “one literary techniques among a range of possibilities” that does not confer indications of quality of a certain 
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  Lydia H. Liu’s early scholarship, for instance, is largely focused on the question of 
subjectivity and the self in modern Chinese literature. In the chapter titled “The Discourse of 
Individualism” in Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated 
Modernity—China, 1900-1937, Liu problematized Průšek’s uncritical use of terms imported 
from the West, often via Japanese neologism, such as “individualism” and “subjectivism.” In 
that chapter, she traces the creation and ever changing meaning of “individualism.” As a 
translated discursive construct, “individualism” underwent various conceptualizations whose 
meaning was both historically contingent and discursively constructed: it was deemed 
compatible with Confucianism when first introduced into late-Qing China and later 
conceived as an antithesis to the nation-state. During the May Fourth period, it was defined 
against a Confucian tradition that was supposedly collective and prioritized familial and 
communal obligations over individual freedom; “individualism” thus was upheld and 
weaponized by May Fourth intellectuals to rebel against a repressive traditional society. In 
the 1930s, however, it came under attack by leftist intellectuals for its complicity in bourgeois 
ideology. Liu is right to point out the historical contingency and discursive constructedness of 
the term “individualism” in the Chinese context, yet after the deconstruction of a cultural 
term what we are left with is a nebulous constellation of meanings with all their 
poststructuralist indeterminacy.  
  In order to develop a working definition of such a contested idea such as subjectivity, a 
return to its definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary might be surprisingly useful and 
revealing. The first OED definition of “subjectivity” is “the quality or condition of being 
                                                                                                                                                        
text (traditional texts were deemed “inferior” for their “lack” of interiority). 
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based on subjective consciousness, experience, etc.” The second definition is divided into 
“consciousness of one’s states or actions” and “a conscious being.” Based on these two 
definitions, we can observe subjectivity’s inseparable associations with consciousness. In 
other words, having subjectivity is predicated on having a consciousness or being conscious. 
The third definition is divided into two sub-groups: a) “The quality in literature or art which 
depends on the expression of the personality or individuality of the artist; the individuality of 
an artist as expressed in his work” and b) “The quality or condition of viewing things chiefly 
or exclusively through the medium of one’s own mind or individuality; the condition of being 
dominated by or absorbed in one’s personal feelings, thoughts, concerns, etc.; individuality, 
personality.” Here the definition of “subjectivity” gets conflated with “individuality” and thus 
acquires the meaning of individuality which can be summarized as unique attributes 
including personality possessed by a person that distinguish him/her from others—the first 
two OED definitions of “individuality.” This belief in the uniqueness of an individual and 
thus worthy of our undiluted attention underlies modern autobiographical writings.  
  “Individuality” also means “being indivisible” from which another key definition is 
derived: “separate and continuous existence as a single indivisible entity” (my emphasis). 
This definition best illustrates the Enlightenment notions of the self that define the self as a 
bounded and discrete entity with inalienable rights to privacy and time to develop.11 As a 
result, its next definition easily slips into the meaning of “individualism” that denotes 
individual freedom, autonomy and independence: “The fact or condition of being free from 
the influence or control of a group, the State, etc.; individual independence or autonomy.” 
                                                 
11 Kant specifically emphasizes the importance of temporal continuity to the formation of a subject.  
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The Enlightenment discourse of individualism thus establishes a dichotomy between the self 
(private) and the political (public) and assumes the sacredness of the former.  
  The slippage between subjectivity, subjectivism, consciousness, individuality, and 
individualism bespeaks the difficulty of defining the meaning of a word or even confirms a 
poststructuralist circuity of the meaning(s) of a word, an endless chain of signifiers that defies 
a final meaning. Yet it may prove to be incredibly productive because whenever subjectivity 
is evoked, it simultaneously evokes a semantic field. It also reveals certain underlying 
assumptions about what defines a modern/Enlightenment self—separate, autonomous, and 
independent, all of which have their roots in individualism.  
  To elucidate the meaning of individualism in the Euro-American context is an even 
more thorny question. It is impossible to parse out every meaning and every school of 
thought due to the scale of this thesis; instead I rely mainly on Steven Lukes, a historian of 
social theory and philosophy, for his elaboration on the basic ideas of individualism. 
Individualism believes in “the intrinsic value of the individual human being” shown in Kant’s 
proclamation that human beings are not a means to an end but in themselves an end (Lukes 
45). Another key idea of individualism is the notion of “autonomy” or “self-direction,” 
“according to which an individual’s thought and action is his own, and not determined by 
agencies and causes out of his control” (Lukes 52). An autonomous individual arrives at 
decisions based on their own reasoning and critical reflection. In other words, as premised by 
classical philosophical discourse, an autonomous individual establishes the rational self as the 
ultimate source of authority. Individual freedom and autonomy is the central value of 
Western liberalism, and was championed by May Fourth intellectuals. Individualism, 
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originating from German Romanticism, also believes in the uniqueness and originality of an 
individual and thus emphasizes the individual’s responsibility to achieve self-development 
and self-actualization.12 Individualism also has its economic and political ramifications 
because Euro-American individualism is the cornerstone of free market economy that 
operates based on rationality (Lukes 88-89). It is essentially what Crawford B. Macpherson 
calls “a bourgeois possessive individualism.”13  
  Enlightenment notions of a separate self rooted in individualism—the key source that 
profoundly influenced the modern discourse on the self in the Chinese context—stand in 
striking contrast with native Chinese models of conceiving the self. Many early China 
scholars agree that distinct from the concept of the self as an autonomous, discrete and 
bordered individual inherited from the Enlightenment, a traditional self was always 
embedded in a net of relationships and defined by those relationships. Sima Qian’s “The Self-
Narration” discussed at the beginning of this chapter gave us a glimpse of such type of self. 
Catherine Bell ventures further to contend that eventually in all traditional societies 
“individual identity is more likely to be experienced as the nodal point of a matrix of 
socializing and humanizing relationships” (qtd. in Brashier 212). Kenneth E. Brashier arrives 
at a somewhat similar conclusion through careful examinations of Han ritual texts, legal 
documents, inscriptions, court rhetoric, etc. Kinship, like names and age, served as the 
primary marker of one’s status, power and social value. Not only common people were 
                                                 
12 See Lukes Chapter Two on individualism in the German context and Chapter Ten “Self-Development”.  
13 The preeminent political philosopher Crawford B. Macpherson identifies the assumption hidden and underlying the 
theories of seventeenth century political thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke as the assumption of “possessive 
individualism.” “Possessive individualism” is “a conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person 
or capacities, owing nothing to society for them the individual is free inasmuch as he is proprietor of his person and 
capacities. …Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political society becomes a calculated device for 
the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange” (3). See Macpherson, The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Hobbes to Locke) (1962). 
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constrained by filial obligations to their parents and ancestors, but also powerful rulers were 
deemed simply an inheritor of the ancestral shrines and the land under heaven and thus not 
free to do whatever they desired. In a ritual exchange on nuptial arrangement prescribed in 
the Ceremonies and rituals 儀禮 that Brashier examines, there is no first-person pronoun “I” 
and instead the interlocutors always refer themselves in third person. Personal agency thus 
was diminished, and the self only existed as “a conglomerate of ties and associations with 
others in the lineage lattice” (Brashier 214).  
  This model of conceiving the self as relational and embedded in a web of kinship and 
other relationships became the kind of traditional epistemology that the iconoclastic May 
Fourth Movement endeavored to dismantle. May Fourth intellectuals associated the weakness 
and ills of Chinese society to “tradition” and thus everything associated with it, such as filial 
piety, Confucianism, the hierarchical (including patriarchal) social structure, the traditional 
family, the institution of arranged marriage, and etc. Instead they embraced Western 
Enlightenment’s autonomous and bounded self as the first step toward modernization and 
building a strong nation.   
  As a result, May Fourth intellectuals’ intense interests in the individual, geren, were 
intricately tied to nationalism and the building of a strong modern nation-state. Their search 
for a modern self was not only an intellectual pursuit but also a political imperative to the 
survival of China as a nation and Chinese people as a species. As Lydia Liu states, 
“subjectivity in writing was thus translated into political reality and acquired an ideological 
significance that responded to a historical need: the reconfiguration of the modern Chinese 
man and woman as self-conscious subjects” (my emphasis, Liu 1990: 3).  
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  The realization that the social self was gendered also focused attention on “the woman 
question,” which figured so prominently in the discursive constructions of an aspirational 
modern self and a modern nation-state. As Wendy Larson points out, women and literature 
were the two important sites for the construction of a modern nation in the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century China (1998, 7). Women’s liberation and the status of 
women became the criteria to measure the civilization of a nation—a notion elaborated in the 
writings of numerous eminent nationalist intellectuals, including Liang Qichao (1873-1929); 
the New Woman became the trope through which a New China can be envisioned and 
articulated. To rebel against the traditional family and arranged marriage, to embrace free 
love and free marriage became the markers of being modern.14  
  The equation between romantic love and the quality of being modern reveals another 
key presupposition of the modern epistemology of the self: a modern self is essentially a 
desiring and affective self.15 The centrality of sentiment in modern Chinese literature has 
been well argued by Haiyan Lee in Revolution of the Heart. Not only the popular literatures 
such as the Butterfly romance centered on romantic love, but also revolutionary and 
nationalist writers often produced and reproduced the so-called revolution plus love pattern.16 
It is typical of literature written during this period to feature a protagonist, usually female, 
                                                 
14 Such a value system seems to be true of people or cultures that wanted to embrace European notions of a modern 
enlightenment, such as the 19th century Russian intelligentsia. Irina Paperno, a prominent literary scholar in Russian 
literature, points out that marriage had its highly semiotic and cultural significance for writers like Chernyshevsky and his 
peers: it was deemed as “a stimulus for action”, “the ultimate realization of real life” (90), and more significantly an act of 
free will (108); it represented a man/woman’s self-assertion and ability to act that distinguishes a positive hero from the 
inability and indecisiveness of the superfluous man (115). In choosing one’s spouse, one exercises his/her agency and is 
regarded the marker of being modern. See Paperno, Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism: a Study in the Semiotics of 
Behavior (1988).  
15 Using theories developed by Western moral philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre who points the modern self as 
“emotivist self,” Haiyan Lee echoes that “the modern subject is first and foremost a sentimental subject” (7). See Revolution 
of the Heart: A Genealogy of Love in China, 1900-1950.  
16 For a detailed discussion of revolution plus love narrative, see Liu Jianmei’s Revolution plus Love: Literary History, 
Women's Bodies, and Thematic Repetition in Twentieth-century Chinese Fiction (2003).  
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who embodies such an affective subject, whose subjectivity is largely constituted of sexual 
desires and romantic longings. To be desiring and longing for romance simultaneously got 
translated into the marker of being modern.    
  However when these aforementioned tenets and assumptions of modern (reads Euro-
American) notions of the self/subject were introduced to a war-ridden, semi-colonial China 
that lacked the very material base on which individualism was presupposed and formed, their 
claim to universality would be sorely tested. Without the existence of a sovereign nation-state 
and a functioning capitalist economy, autonomy and freedom of the possessive individual 
could be something that May Fourth intellectuals only championed and aspired to yet never 
within reach. The signing of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) that catalyzed the May Fourth 
Movement was simply another awakening call to see the forced and humiliating encounter 
with Western and Japanese imperialism.  
  Lu Xun’s literary career seems to bespeak a gradual disillusionment with Western 
Enlightenment notions of individualism. He transformed from a champion of Romanticists’ 
individual genius in “On the Power of Mara Poetry” 摩羅詩力說 (1907) to a self-doubting 
post-individualist in the Preface to Call to Arms 吶喊 (1922). In “On the Power of Mara 
Poetry,” Lu Xun extols European Romanticists such as Shelley, Byron, and Pushkin for 
creating great works of literature that are able to “[speak] with strength to stir new life in their 
countrymen and make their country a great one” (107). In his final impassioned calling for 
their Chinese equivalent (“Where are the warriors of the spirit?”), Lu Xun envisions himself 
on par with all those Romanticists as the national poet of China carrying out his historical 
mission. Lu Xun’s attitude toward literature and the question of whether literature can bring 
 12 
 
real social and political transformation becomes more ambivalent and skeptical in the Preface 
to Call to Arms. His self doubt and reflection begin: “I was no hero, no demagogue capable 
of rousing the masses with a single battle-cry” (18).17 “In Memoriam” 傷逝 (1925), the 
subject of the next chapter’s analysis, casts a grimmer look on the type of selfhood 
engendered by individualism. The first-person narrator, Juansheng, an educated male 
intellectual, abandons his wife when their union as a result of romantic love and free marriage 
turns out to be economically unviable and impinges upon his individual freedom.  
  Ding Ling’s later conversion to a leftist/Communist politics best illustrated her 
abandonment of a bourgeois individualism.18 Even though when Ding Ling was still very 
much enchanted with individualism, her attempt to textually create a New Woman, Miss 
Sophia, an educated woman with psychological depths as well as sexual and emotional 
desires, ends on the hint of her approaching demise. Sophia, who embodies many of the 
ideals upheld by May Fourth intellectuals such as leaving a traditional family and pursuing 
independence and love, can only reach an ontological impasse in the end. Thus both texts 
deal with the finiteness of life as well as fragility of the self; both texts interrogate the cultural 
ideals of their time. It is as if the Chinese modern self at its inception was fragile and under 
the threat of death. One of the objectives of this thesis is to chart out the tortuous processes of 
affirming and writing that fragile self into existence by two writers most representative of 
their time.   
                                                 
17The translation of “Mara Poetry” used here is in Modern Chinese Literary Thought: Writings on Literature 1893-1945. ed. 
Kirk A. Denton. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1996. The translations of Nahan and Panghuang are from Julia Lovell’s The 
Real Story of Ah-Q and Other Tales of China: the Complete Fiction of Lu Xun.  
18 For a thorough discussion on Ding Ling’s oeuvre and literary career, especially how her works changed in relation to her 
changing ideological commitment, see Feuerwerker, Ding Ling's Fiction: Ideology and Narrative in Modern Chinese 
Literature (1982). 
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  Now I turn to the dialectic relations between form and social reality and the reason I 
place such primacy on literary form. It was by no accident that Lu Xun and Ding Ling chose 
first-person narratives to construct an aspirational modern self while simultaneously 
interrogating the epistemological assumptions hidden and underlying that self. The rise of 
first-person narrative form and narrative technique that extensively focuses on a character’s 
subjectivity and interiority was a result of that particular historical moment. György Lukács 
in Modern Drama already pointed out the social nature of literary form and its dialectic 
relation to social reality: “But in literature, what is truly social is form …. Form is social 
reality, it participates vivaciously in the life of the spirit. It therefore does not operate only as 
a factor acting upon life and moulding experiences, but also as a factor which is in turn 
moulded by life” (qtd. in Moretti, 10).19 This is particularly true for the discussion of May 
Fourth literature because the predicament of China in the early twentieth century spurred 
May Fourth writers’ searching for new forms to capture the Zeitgeist of their time; this New 
Literature, with its formal and generic innovations, in turn would bring social and political 
transformations.20  
  In order to better attend to the specific formal and generic qualities of specific literary 
texts, this thesis draws on theories of genre, Russian formalist theorist Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
theory of double-voiced discourse, as well as a sociolinguistic approach to the discourse of 
the first person, a Marxist approach to literary form and subject formation, a poststructuralist 
notion of the self as textually produced, and so on and so forth. In other words, it is the 
                                                 
19 Franco Moretti, Signs Taken for Wonders: On the Sociology of Literary Forms. Another Marxist literary critic, Raymond 
Williams echoes Lukács’ formulation and contends that form is a social relationship, “a historical practice in the social 
material process” (184). See Williams, Marxism and Literature.  
20 Even though many intellectuals such as Lu Xun remained skeptical of whether literature, or even writing in general, could 
bring real social changes, they nevertheless kept writing. Lu Xun’s writing thus is full of self-doubt and awareness of the 
limits of representation. 
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aesthetic idiosyncrasy of a literary text that determines which theoretical tool is more 
appropriate. I also occasionally draw on studies of literary texts from other textual traditions 
and of different national origins, including English, Russian, and French literature. In so 
doing, I am not suggesting there is an equivalency between modern Chinese literature and 
“Western literature,” nor am I suggesting that “Western theories” are universally applicable 
to texts from any tradition. What I am attempting to accomplish is to borrow illuminating 
methods from other fields within the same discipline of the study of literature in the hope of 
doing more justice to literary texts. It goes without saying that every theory has its limit, even 
for the study of texts from the same social and linguistic tradition. One way to overcome that, 
as discussed before, is to place primacy on literary texts and let the intrinsic aesthetic 
qualities of literary texts determine which methodological tool might be more fit to do justice 
to the text. 
For instance, when reading “In Memoriam,” a first-person narrative dominated by the 
voice of the male narrator, Juansheng, we still feel such a strong presence of the often silent 
female spouse, Zijun. In order to make sense of it, Bakhtin’s theory of double-voiced 
discourse can be particularly useful in this circumstance. Double-voiced discourse, according 
to Bakhtin, is a discourse that is directed both to its referential object and to someone else’s 
discourse (whether that person is present at moment of utterance or not). It can be a dialogue 
conducted between the speaker and an invisible speaker whose words are not present but have 
“determining influence on all the present and visible words of the first speaker” (my 
emphasis, Bakhtin 197).21 This insight could fundamentally alter the way we read many of 
                                                 
21 I will discuss double-voiced discourse more thoroughly in the next chapter.  
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the much-discussed and canonical first-person narratives in modern Chinese literature—we 
can come to view first-person narrative as a dialogue and not simply as one voice dominating 
the entire narrative. As a result, Zijun, the dead spouse of the male narrator, can no longer be 
read simply as a silent and erased object; she influences and alters the narrator’s discourse as 
well as self-perception even though he endeavors to affirm the self and erase her existence. 
This example illustrates how theory can help us to better attend to such dynamic and complex 
formal mechanisms intrinsic in a literary text. To recapitulate the main objective of this 
thesis, it is to attend to and examine how those formal and generic complexities of a literary 
text complicate and problematize construction of modern selfhood by drawing on various 
literary and cultural theories. It attempts to chart out the tortuous processes of affirming and 
writing the self into existence by two writers most representative of their time.
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CHAPTER II 
“I SHALL USE FORGETTING AND LYING AS MY GUIDE TO GOING 
FORWARD”: THE FAILED (RE)AFFIRMATION AND (RE)CONSTITUTION OF A 
COHERENT SELF IN LU XUN’S “IN MEMORIAM” 
 Theodore Huters argues that due to the unbearable and monolithic weight of a literary 
tradition, modern Chinese literature, especially May Fourth literature, should largely be 
interpreted as a direct response to and confrontation with that tradition, and thus “univocal” 
or “monological.”22 Huters here uses Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of univocality or monological 
discourse to illustrate the presence of a single and strong authorial voice which is 
“determined to not dilute its control over a given text and all other voices within it” in 
traditional and modern Chinese literature (Huters 271). In other words, Huters suggests that 
premodern and modern Chinese literature lacks a plurality of voices and consciousnesses, or 
what Bakhtin calls “heteroglossia” or “polyphonic.”23   
 Univocality might manifest itself in the form of a didactic authorial voice as in most 
traditional narratives or in authorial solipsism as in many modern narratives. Mao Dun, a 
leading figure in the movement of reforming and revolutionizing Chinese literature, 
specifically attacks both Chinese literary traditions and his contemporaries for failing to pay 
attention to the objective social world and only investing their interests in subjective 
expressions: “In sum, our writers from ancient times on…only knew the subjective and did 
                                                 
22 See Huters, “Lives in Profile: On the Authorial Voice in Modern and Contemporary Chinese Literature” in From May 
Fourth to June Fourth Fiction and Film in Twentieth-century China. 
23 Bakhtin in Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics establishes that the main characteristic of Dostoyevsky’s novel is its 
polyphonic nature: “a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses” is presented in the text, each with 
its own equal rights and its own world (6). Univocality refers to “the stylistic phenomenon [of writing] a direct and 
unmediated expression of authorial individuality” (267). See M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays. 
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not know the objective” (qtd. in Huters 276).24 Huters subsequently reads “Diary of a 
Madman” as a manifestation of that confining monological voice as well as a meta-fiction 
that points to the limits of that voice—the madman in the end fails to arrive at any meaning or 
to analyze his role in society, but eventually loses his identity as he finds out he is also 
complicit in practicing cannibalism; his attempt to establish himself as the sole source of 
authority eventually fails.  
  While I agree that “Diary” can be interpreted as a meta-narrative, a warning against 
excessive and thus confining subjectivity, I nevertheless find Huters’s argument far too 
general and his conception of Bakhtinian univocality and polyphony a misunderstanding. It is 
precisely because modern Chinese literature was locked in a confrontation with traditional 
literature that it cannot be univocal but what Bakhtin calls a “double-voiced discourse,” or 
“discourse with an orientation toward someone else’s discourse” (Bakhtin 1984: 199). 
According to Bakhtin, all works of literature to a certain degree can be double-voiced:  
 
In every style, strictly speaking, there is an element of internal polemic, the difference 
being merely one of degree and character. Every literary discourse more or less sharply 
senses its own listener, reader, critic, and reflects in itself anticipated objections, 
evaluations, points of view. In addition, literary discourse senses alongside itself another 
literary discourse, another style. (1984: 196) 
 
The other literary discourse is so patently present in the frame narrative of “Diary” written in 
classical Chinese, a language system that iconoclastic May Fourth intellectuals were 
endeavoring to dismantle.25 A piece of literary work thus is always in a dialogue with its 
                                                 
24 Mao Dun, “文学和人的关系及中国古来对于文学者身份的误认” (Literature, Its Relation to Human, and the 
Misperceptions on the Identity of Writer) in 茅盾文艺杂论集 (The Anthology of Mao Dun’s Literary Criticism). 
25 The classical diction in the frame story I believe also illustrates what Bakhtin calls “parodic stylization” in the sense that 
Lu Xun appropriates the style of classical Chinese for a completely different purpose than that of the original style. Parodic 
stylization is of course a type of double-voiced discourse.  
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given literary tradition, or as Yi-tsi Mei Feuerwerker nicely puts it, “to write was an act that 
situated the self within an ongoing literary tradition, since writing was consciously conceived 
of as textual transmission and constituted by intertextual activity” (56). 
  In terms of the narrative’s internal structure, the discourse in the frame narrative can 
be construed as structurally as well as hermeneutically in dialogue with the voice of the 
madman: it provides a foreclosure for the story’s ending, a diagnosis of his symptoms, a 
guidance of how to interpret the madman’s words, and more importantly, a deconstruction of 
his words. Hence whether there is an actual conversation between two interlocutors has little 
bearing on whether the narrative is dialogical. Bakhtin specifically emphasizes that a 
character’s discourse can be double-voiced if they speak in a way that anticipates the reaction 
of another character who may be absent. He elucidates in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 
on the dialogical nature of Dostoevsky’s novels that even if the narrative is conducted in the 
first-person, i.e. in the absence of an interlocutor, nevertheless that invisible speaker whose 
words are not present can have “determining influence on all the present and visible words of 
the first speaker” (197).  
 To conceive of a first-person narrative as dialogical or double-voiced will fundamentally 
change how we interpret some of the much-discussed May Fourth first-person narratives that 
have been deemed solipsistic. Bakhtin thereby quotes another Dostoevsky critic Valery 
Yakovlevich Kirpotin to illustrate the polyphonic and thus anti-solipsistic nature of 
Dostoevsky’s fiction and calls Kirpotin’s reading “a correct understanding of Dostoevsky’s 
polyphony” (original emphasis, 1984, 37):  
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Whether the Dostoevskian narrative is conducted in the first person, or in the form of a 
confession, or in the person of a narrator-author—in all cases we see that the writer 
proceeds from an assumption of equal rights for simultaneously existing, experiencing 
persons. His world is the world of a multitude of objectively existing and interacting 
psychologies, and this excludes his treatment of psychological processes the subjectivism 
and solipsism so characteristic of bourgeois decadence. (original emphasis, qtd. in 
Bakhtin 1984: 37) 
 
This is not to say that all May Fourth literature that later came under attack for its excessive 
subjectivism and solipsism are exactly like Dostoevsky’s polyphonic fictions, that they 
contain no elements of subjectivism and solipsism, or that they grant “equal rights” to the 
voices of every character. But there is always certain degree of dialogization or double-
voicedness even if in a most solipsistic text like “Diary of a Madman.” The voice of the 
social Other always permeates into the discourse as well as consciousness of the narrating “I” 
and unsettles the boundary between the self and the other, between the subjective and the 
objective. Building on such double-voiced/dialogical nature of first-person narrative, the 
following part of this chapter turns to one of Lu Xun’s canonical first-person narratives, “In 
Memoriam,” and attempts to analyze how it attests to the difficulty of discursively creating 
and maintaining a purely subjective, bordered and autonomous self. 
 Lu Xun’s “In Memoriam” written in 1925 is, according to Lydia Liu, not only “a story 
about the disillusionment of romantic love” but also an allegory for failed modernity (1993:2, 
107). Lu Xun’s dystopian story has painted such a grim portrayal of free love and free 
marriage that at his time were hailed as markers of being modern as well as part of the larger 
social engineering toward China’s progress and modernity. In this sense Lu Xun was indeed 
ahead of his time for he had already begun to question ideals such as free love, free marriage, 
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and the establishment of nuclear family that had their roots in Euro-American individualism 
and were championed by both male and female intellectuals at that time.  
 Yet to simply summarize what the story is about would fail to do justice to such a 
complex text. It can be easily noticed that throughout the text the voice of the male narrator, 
Juansheng, dominates the narrative and is able to manipulate it to his advantage while his 
spouse, Zijun, for the most part, remains silent and forever under erasure. Both Rey Chow 
and Lydia Liu have pointed out that most women in Lu Xun’s fictions are devoid of agency 
and subjectivity.26 Yet the presence of Zijun is keenly felt in the text despite Juansheng’s 
heavy mediation, such as willful omissions and eclipses. He fails to obtain an acquittal he so 
desperately seeks from a jury, be it his own conscience, Zijun or us as (un)intended audience 
despite all his rationalization for what he has done to Zijun. Drawing on Bakhtin’s theory of 
double-voice discourse and attending to other generic and aesthetic features of the text, such 
as visuality, this chapter explores how Lu Xun deploys a speaking subject “I” in “In 
Memoriam” so that the narrative is able to work to the advantage of the narrator while 
simultaneously disclosing the cruel and selfish nature of the speaking “I.” How does Zijun 
exist and occupy a narrative space even though Juansheng’s narrative endeavors to erase her? 
How can a narrative dominated by the male narrator still create an ontological space for the 
female Other? I argue that Juansheng’s seemingly dominating voice is in fact double-voiced; 
Zijun as the (in)visible Other inevitably imposes pressure and haunts the narrative. Thus the 
male speaking subject’s self is never autonomous or coherent, and its attempt to affirm the 
living self and exorcise the dead female alterity is bound to fail. 
                                                 
26 See Rey Chow’s chapter “Narration and Modernity” (p.84-85) in Women and Chinese Modernity, and Lydia Liu, 
“Narratives of Modern Selfhood: First-Person Fiction in May Fourth Literature” (102-123) in Politics, Ideology and Literary 
Discourse in Modern China.  
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Generic Signals and Functions 
  In his study of the function of genre in literature, Alastair Fowler contends that the 
main value of genres is not classificatory but identifying and communicatory. As Fowler 
nicely puts it, “in literary communication, genres are functional” (38). Identifying the genre 
of a work provides guidance to the interpretation of the work. In other words, how we 
perceive and decide the genre of a work fundamentally changes how we understand and 
interpret that work. The title and beginning of a literary work usually signal its genre, and 
those are what Fowler calls “generic signals.” Clustered at the beginning of a work, those 
generic signals have “a strategic role in guiding the reader” because “they help to establish, as 
soon as possible, an appropriate mental ‘set’ that allows the work’s generic codes to be read” 
(Fowler 88).  
  The title of the short story reads “伤逝,” meaning mourning for the lost or dead. It is 
translated as “In Memoriam” in Julia Lovell’s translation. The memorial genre is essentially 
the writing about the dead and what’s been lost. Since every genre is functional, we have to 
ask: what is the function of a memoriam? And for whom is it written? In her study of female 
suicide in China, anthropologist Margery Wolf points out that people believed women who 
killed themselves would become angry ghosts and haunt the living, especially those who had 
done them wrong; revenge is constantly associated with suicide.27 A prominent literary 
example is in Honglou Meng where Jia Baoyu makes an offering to Jinchuan who had 
drowned herself in a well after being accused of flirting with Baoyu and humiliated. Almost 
ten chapters later, Baoyu secretly goes off to a temple to make an offering to someone whose 
                                                 
27 See Margery Wolf, “Women and Suicide in China” in Women in Chinese Society, p.111-141.  
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name is never mentioned. Even though Baoyu’s actions are never explicitly explained in the 
text, there are several hints and allusions that point to the death of Jinchuan as the motive. For 
instance, the temple in which Baoyu makes the sacrifice is a water spirit temple (洛神廟), 
and the day on which Baoyu does it is Jinchuan’s birthday; on his way home he finds 
Jinchuan’s sister crying and attempts to initiate a conversation with her about his secret 
action; the chapter ends with a reference to “The Wooden Hairpin”荊釵記, a play in which 
the husband makes an offering to his drowned wife.28  
  In premodern memorial culture in general, writings such as literary creations and ritual 
liturgies were used to conjure up the spirit of the dead and serve as sacrifices to them.29 A 
memoriam then is written and has a ritualistic function to appease and exorcize ghosts so that 
the living can go on living. Seen in this light, I agree with Lydia Liu’s contention that the act 
of writing for Juansheng serves to “exorcize her ghost from his memory” (112); it is “a 
therapeutic device for the reconstitution of a coherent self” that is shattered by her death 
(107). Yet just as the abandonment of the dog prefigures the fate of Zijun, the return of the 
abandoned dog is the metonymic return of Zijun and the best proof of the failed exorcism of 
this memoriam.  
  There also has been a long tradition of male literati writing about dead women as 
vessels for expressing their own frustration and other emotions. Xiaoqing小青, for instance, a 
concubine and a female poet who was abused by the first wife and died young sometime 
early in the seventeenth century, became the subject matter of a great many male literati 
                                                 
28 The plot mentioned here is in chapter 43 in Honglou Meng.  
29 Michael Nylan for instance contends that the various biographies in the Shiji are essentially sacrifices to the dead people 
recorded in those biographies. Nylan cites one chapter on sacrifice in the Liji禮記 to illustrate the definition of sacrifice is to 
visualize the dead and make sacrifices to them. Through the “sacred act” of writing, imagining, and visualizing the life of 
those people, Sima Qian accomplishes the ritual visualization called sacrifice and fulfills his religious duty to them. See 
Nylan, “Sima Qian: A True Historian?” Early China 23-24 (1998-99): 203-246.  
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writings. The proliferation and popularity of fictions and dramas on Xiaoqing’s life story, 
according to Ellen Widmer, were largely due to male intellectuals’ sense of alienation and 
frustration during and after the disastrous Tianqi reign period.30 They saw the story of a 
talented yet abused concubine “as an emblem of their frustration with difficult times” 
(Widmer 122). Xiaoqing, like many other dead and silent women, became the vessel for male 
literati to express their feelings and (re)affirm an alienated self. 
  The opening sentence of “In Memoriam” confirms the purpose of writing is not only 
for Zijun, the dead wife, but also the male writing self: “I want to try, if I possibly can, to set 
down here my feelings of sorrow and regret—for Zijun, and for myself” 如果我能夠，我要
寫下我的悔恨和悲哀，為子君，為自己。 (254).” If “it is in and through language that 
man constitutes himself as a subject” as Benveniste puts it (221), then this beginning that 
starts with “I” immediately establishes Juansheng, the narrator’s personal agency and 
subjectivity; each “I” occupies the subject position and claims its agency and free will to 
write. As mentioned before, the beginning of a literary work, or what Fowler calls “opening 
formula,” provides guidance for the reader to interpret the text. The opening formula here 
points to the purpose of the act of writing, yet due to its equivocation it leaves the reader 
wondering whom it is really for.31 “为子君” serves as a pretext for self-assertion, a cover for 
self-serving purpose; the entire narrative functions in such a way in which it proclaims to be 
written for the sake of Zijun but in fact serves to reaffirm the self. Yet in a Derridian sense, 
the male self cannot be established without the female Other; the self cannot exist without its 
                                                 
30 For a detailed discussion of male and female reception of and writings about Xiaoqing, see Ellen Widmer’s “Xiaoqing’s 
Literary Legacy and the Place of the Woman Writer in Late Imperial China.”  
31 Lydia Liu in her reading of the story also notices another layer of equivocation: whether Juansheng regrets his 
abandonment of Zijuan or him having been involved in a romantic relationship with her in the first place. See Liu, 
“Narratives of Modern Selfhood: First Person Fiction in May Fourth Literature” p.111. 
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female alterity. Thus the male narrator’s attempt to appease and exorcize Zijun’s ghost is 
bound to fail and has only resulted in lying and forgetting: “[I] shall use forgetting and lying 
as my guide” 用遺忘和說謊做我的前導 (133; Lovell 272). His words signify nothing; the 
subject no longer speaks truth.  
 The subtitle of this story, “From Juansheng’s notes” 涓生的手記, is another revealing 
generic signal that provides interpretive guidance and sets up reader’s expectations. It first 
plays on the notion of a found text, disguising fiction underneath a claim to be real. Just as 
the narrator in the frame story of “Diary of a Madman” claims to have found the diary, here 
the notes of Juansheng are also found. But by whom? Who actually has found the text is 
omitted, but the third-person possessive adjective “Juansheng’s” already indicates the 
existence of a third party, be it the implied author or the ideal reader, who gazes at, reads, and 
judges such a found text. In other words, there is already an imposing presence and 
omniscient gaze existing outside the mimetic world in the text. As we read on, we clearly see 
that Juansheng also has anticipated the moral judgment from himself (though the extent to 
which Juansheng is capable of self-critique is very limited), from Zijun, and from his possible 
readers. Thus his dominating voice is already dialogized and his sense of the self split. In the 
following part of the essay, I will analyze how Zijun imposes a determining influence on the 
discourse and consciousness of Juansheng and how Juansheng’s attempt to exclude her 
presence and (re)affirm the self fails.  
Erasing the Other and (Re)Affirming the Self 
  Käte Hamburger points out in The Logic of Literature that there is a fundamental 
difference between the narrative in epistolary/diary writing and in the memoir novel. In a 
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diary, its temporal point progresses “from one temporal present” to another, and gradually 
they form a totality of the life of the writing subject. The writer of a memoir, however, “looks 
back from one fixed temporal present over the whole of his past life” as well as over “past 
stages of its own self” (326). The former self and his/her earlier phases are objectified by, and 
I would add under the scrutiny of, the present writing subject (327). The self thus is already 
split and separated by the temporal distance existing between the former and present self.  
  In “In Memoriam” there exist three levels of temporality as Lydia Liu observes: 1) the 
temporality in which Juansheng is writing, 2) the temporality in which Juansheng and Zijun 
start their own nuclear family and live together, and 3) the temporality in which Juansheng 
still lives alone and they have started dating. The “I” in the first temporal level looks 
retrospectively at the other two temporal levels and puts them in perspective, and sometimes 
the “I” in the second temporal level reminisces about previous happy days in the third 
temporal level (Liu 108). It is worth pointing out the beginning of the narrative, i.e. the first 
temporal level, is marked by a return to the third level. In other words, the narrative is 
cyclical:  
 
And how unfortunate that I should now happen to return to this same room, unchanged in 
every way: the same broken window, the same moribund locust tree and ancient wisteria, 
the same square table, the same mildewed wall, the same plank bed pushed against it. As 
I lie on it now, alone and awake in the middle of the night, the past year seems to fade 
away, as if I had never lived with Zijun, as if I had never moved out of this shabby room 
to set up my own hopeful little family in Goodluck Lane. (113; Lovell 254) 
    事情又這麼不湊巧，我重來時，偏偏空著的又只有這一間屋。依然是這樣的破
窗，這樣的窗外的半枯的槐樹和老紫藤，這樣的窗前的方桌，這樣的敗壁，這樣
的靠壁的板床。深夜中獨自躺在床上，就如我未曾和子君同居以前一般，過去一
年中的時光全被消滅，全未有過，我並沒有曾經從這破屋子搬出，在吉兆胡同創
立了滿懷希望的小小的家庭。 
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The present “I” returns physically to the same room where he had resided; the repetition of 
the descriptive language not only emphasizes an unchangingness and sameness of the 
physical environment but also creates an illusion of an unchanging reality where events never 
took place and any sense of temporal progression is erased. This unchanged cyclical 
beginning is of course ironic because patently the death of his spouse happened. This 
beginning is working toward the first step to erase the existence of his spouse; it is an illusion 
that he literally would rather believe in, a simulacrum in which nothing has ever happened.  
  As the narrative continues, the first-person narrator continues to erase Zijun’s 
existence, and his memory by his own admission is extremely unreliable. The narrator admits 
himself numerous times that he cannot remember certain past events clearly. For instance, he 
confesses that he cannot recall how he has courted Zijun: “I can no longer remember how I 
expressed my pure and passionate love to her. Soon afterwards, the detail grew hazy in my 
mind—thinking back over them at night, I could only recall fragments” 我已經記不清那時
怎樣地將我的純真熱烈的愛表示給她。豈但現在，那時的事後便已模胡，夜間回想，
早只剩了一些斷片了 (115; Lovell 256). Even key moments such as him proposing to her 
have also faded away in his memory: “At that moment I did not see clearly my own behavior 
as well as Zijun’s” 不但我自己的，便是子君的言語舉動，我那時就沒有看得分明 (116; 
Lovell 256). In the following sentence the narrator uses “彷彿記得” (seem to remember) to 
narrate how the event unfolds. Lydia Liu points out that it is because the narrator feels 
embarrassed about the moment of proposal that he willfully forgets the details of that moment 
(1993:2, 196). Episodes like these reveal the highly unreliable and manipulative nature of his 
memory as well as his narrative.   
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  The use of punctuation, a significant number of ellipses in the text in particular, also 
reveals the male narrator’s willful omission. The narrative in fact ends with an ellipsis: “[I] 
shall use forgetting and lying as my guide…” 用遺忘和說謊做我的前導……。The ellipsis 
deprives the narrative of a sense of closure. The signifying system of words can no longer 
fulfill its function, and instead a punctuate mark that indicates something has been omitted is 
put in its place. Emptiness, oblivion, omission are literally on display in the end. It signifies 
nothing but could also signify everything—the endless cycle of forgetting and not being able 
to forget, lying and omission, attempting to affirm the self and its failure. Just as the 
beginning of the narrative is a return to the narrator’s previous living condition, the end 
leaves us wondering if the entire narrative is already written under the guidance of forgetting 
and lying.  
  Yet despite the male narrator’s willful omissions and oblivion, his female spouse, 
Zijun’s presence in the text is never fully erased. Even though Zijun, no matter living or dead, 
remains mostly silent and is denied access to the discursive realm, her presence has 
permeated into the discourse of the male narrator. First, I would like to point out that Zijun 
exists in the text both as a spectre and spectacle, i.e. she exists mainly as a ghostly presence 
of sound (non-discursive) and image. Zijun’s initial entrance into the text is conjured up 
through the haunting sound of her footsteps and a following visualization of her image: 
 
Another thing I now noticed. A year before, the stillness and emptiness about the place 
was different, full of expectation: the impatient expectation of Zijun’s arrival. I would 
spring to life the instant I heard the crisp clip of high-heeled shoes along the bricked 
road. Then her round, pale, dimpled face, thin white arms, striped blouse and black skirt 
would swing into view. 
    不但如此。在一年之前，這寂靜和空虛是並不這樣的，常常含著期待；期待子
君的到來。在久待的焦躁中，一聽到皮鞋的高底尖觸著磚路的清響，是怎樣地使
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我驟然生動起來呵！於是就看見帶著笑渦的蒼白的圓臉，蒼白的瘦的臂膊，布的
有條紋的衫子，玄色的裙。(113; Lovell 254)  
 
Piece by piece, the narrator’s words deliver the existence of Zijun: first the apparition of the 
sound of Zijun’s footsteps and then the image of her physical body. The descriptive phrases 
only describe her body in parts and are listed in a paratactic fashion with no coordinating 
conjunctions as if Zijun already existed as an assemblage of visual fragments. For someone 
who claims to love this woman so adamantly, this description seems incredibly terse with so 
few details as if her image is already fuzzy and blurred. Further the double appearance of the 
adjective “苍白” again emphasizes the ghostliness of Zijun for its lack of sanguinity and thus 
liveliness.  
  If at this moment Zijun’s audible presence elicits excitement from the narrator, her 
later presence intrudes and annoys, making the narrator long for the tranquility of his former 
life as a bachelor: “the change in her began to unsettle me, and suddenly an image of my 
former, quiet life—the tranquility of that shabby old hostel room—flashed before my eyes” 
我的心因此更繚亂，忽然有安寧的生活的影像—會館裡的破屋的寂靜，在眼前一閃 
(120; Lovell 261). While Zijun toils away under the burden of housework that has been solely 
fallen on her shoulders and becomes exhausted by such strenuous labor, Juansheng laments 
the loss of tranquility at home and blames Zijun for “no longer [taking] as much care to be 
quiet or considerate as she had once done” 子君又沒有先前那麼幽靜，善於體帖了 (121; 
Lovell 261-262). The sound of her cooking and conducting other housework apparently 
disturbs Juansheng’s inner peace and thus intrudes into a discrete and bordered self he 
endeavors to maintain.  
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  Zijun’s existence as a visual image poses even more penetrating threats to the male 
narrator’s sense of self, silently passing moral judgment that pierces into the very core of his 
self-consciousness. As the narrative goes on, Juansheng’s cruel mistreatments to her begin to 
occur, and Zijun barely speaks. What speaks instead is the description of her facial expression 
of sadness and sorrow (“凄然” “凄惨”), her child-like eyes as if the narrative is a camera that 
reveals a close up on her face. Patrick Hanan has observed, echoed by Marston Anderson, the 
camera-like quality of Lu Xun’s narrative.32 The function of close-ups in films is not only to 
foreground the emotion of the subject on the screen but also make the reader/audience 
identify with him/her. It thus establishes an intersubjectivity between Zijun and the 
reader/audience. Seen in this light, the trans-media quality of such a literary text nicely 
explains why our sympathy lies with Zijun not Juansheng, and Zijun’s ontological existence 
in the text is not merely as an object. The images of her sad face takes on a life of its own and 
is able to obtain certain degree of agency; she constantly haunts the memory of Juansheng 
and becomes something that he desperately wants to get rid of.  
  Even though Zijun never voices words of condemnation, her silence imposes “a 
determining influence,” to use Bakhtin’s phrase, on the discourse and consciousness of the 
male narrator. After Juansheng abandons Asui the dog, he has to provide a lengthy reasoning 
to rationalize his cruelty because he senses that Zijun is judging him: 
 
But based on her tone and body language, I finally saw that she must have thought I was 
heartless. In fact if I’d been on my own, I’d have easily made a living. My pride had 
prevented me from having much to do with old family friends, and since moving out of 
the hostel I’d neglected all my former acquaintances. If only I could go away, the road of 
living should be quite broad. Everything I was putting up with now—all the difficulties, 
                                                 
32 See Patrick Hanan “The Technique of Lu Hsun’s Fiction” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 34 (1974): p. 89 and 
Marston Anderson The Limits of Realism p.112. 
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the pressures—it was all for her, mostly. I’d got rid of Asui for her, too, but her senses 
seemed to grow weaker by the day, and she couldn't even see it.  
    我終於從她言動上看出，她大概已經認定我是一個忍心的人。其實，我一個人
，是容易生活的，雖然因為驕傲，向來不與世交來往，遷居以後，也疏遠了所有
舊識的人，然而只要能遠走高飛，生路還寬廣得很。現在忍受著這生活壓迫的苦
痛，大半倒是為她，便是放掉阿隨，也何嘗不如此。但子君的識見卻似乎只是淺
薄起來，竟至於連這一點也想不到了。(123; Lovell 263) 
 
The narrator clearly senses Zijun’s blame and judgment and thus feels the need to justify 
himself and shift the blame to Zijun. He imputes the pain and difficulties he has to suffer 
specifically to Zijun for he as the sole bread-earner has to provide the livelihood for him, his 
spouse and their surrogate child, Asui the dog. He further claims that his abandonment of 
Asui is also “for her.” Again as in the beginning of the narrative where he claims his writing 
is for Zijun, he disguises his self-serving and selfish nature in the name of an altruistic effort 
for the benefits of Zijun.  
  The moral judgment silently passed from Zijun has resulted in the male narrator’s 
changing of discourse, but it has never resulted in a true confession, self-critique or 
repentance on his part like many Dostoevskian heroes and heroes in Lydia Ginzburg’s 
fictions.33 Juansheng sees himself as a cruel and heartless person through the eyes of Zijun 
and this shatters his own sense of self, yet instead of redeeming his cruelty he tries to affirm 
his self. In her systematic study of Lydia Ginzburg’s prose writing, Emily Van Buskirk points 
out that self-distancing, i.e. estrangement, or viewing oneself from the point of view of 
another is vital to Ginsburg's creation of heroes capable of moral judgment. Buskirk calls this 
                                                 
33 Lydia Ginzburg (1902-1990) was a prominent Soviet literary critic, historian and writer. She was also a survivor of the 
Siege of Leningrad and other purges during Stalinist era. Many of her works thus interrogate individual will and human 
survival under extreme historical and social circumstances, which resulted in her deep skepticism of European 
Enlightenment notions of an individualist self. Emily Van Buskirk, a literary scholar in the Russia field, calls the type of self 
produced in Ginzburg’s writing a “post-individualist self” in her recent study of Ginzburg’s oeuvre. I find the notion of a 
post-individualist self and her discussion of self-distancing particularly useful to shed light on similar qualities that can be 
observed on Juansheng in “In Memoriam.”  
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type of individual or selfhood created a “post-individualist” self, a self that is no longer 
unique, autonomous, self-sufficient, and believing in personal agency and self-realization but 
fragmentary and part of the social fabric.34  
  Similarly Juansheng possesses a certain degree of self-distancing, being outside of the 
self, and judging the self. For instance, in order to pave the path for his abandoning of Zijun, 
Juansheng deliberately regurgitates the words he once uttered to Zijun on European Romantic 
writers and literature, Nora in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House in particular, that were once used to 
cement their romantic relationship and “liberate” Zijun the oppressed woman.35 But now the 
courage and resolve of Nora that once was used to encourage Zijun to break away from an 
oppressive traditional family and choose free love is now used to insinuate that Zijun should 
voluntarily leave a loveless marriage. The narrator is aware that those same words have 
already become empty signifiers: “All this had been said the previous year in that shabby old 
room in the hostel, but now my words rang hollow. As I listened to myself, I constantly 
suspected there was an invisible urchin behind me maliciously parroting all I said” 也還是去
年在會館的破屋裡講過的那些話，但現在已經變成空虛，從我的嘴傳入自己的耳中，
時時疑心有一個隱形的壞孩子，在背後惡意地刻毒地學舌 (126; Lovell 266). There 
seems to be a temporal distance between the words uttered from his mouth and the words 
eventually entering his ear. In other words, it is as if for a moment his own words exist 
outside of himself. The parroting urchin further adds another level of alienation and 
estrangement to his utterances as if he no longer has control over the meaning of the words he 
                                                 
34 For a detailed discussion of Ginzburg’s conceptualizations of self, ethics, literature, and their interrelations, see chapter 1 
“Writing the Self after the Crisis of Individualism: Distancing and Moral Evaluation” in Emily Van Buskirk’s Lydia 
Ginsburg’s Prose: Reality in Search of Literature.  
35 Ibsen’s play A Doll’s House had profound influence on the May Fourth discourse on marriage freedom and equality. Many 
celebrated Nora’s resolve and hailed her as an ideal. Lu Xun, however, in a famed essay娜拉走後怎樣 poignantly points out 
Nora, without economical independence, can only return to her oppressive home or become a prostitute.  
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utters. The invisible urchin could be a psychological doubling of himself that mocks the 
hypocritical words he is uttering now. In sum, there is someone or something that exists 
outside of himself and simultaneously judges him. The “I” narrator is capable of being self-
conscious and aware of his own hypocrisy and how he is taking advantage of once a 
liberating discourse to accomplish the cruelest deed.  
  However the essential difference between him and a Ginzburg or Dostoevskian hero is 
that eventually he is incapable of self-critique but only attempts to clear his self-conscience. 
Toward the end of the story, the narrative gets wrapped up in an intense eruption of 
confessional emotions that serves to exorcize Zijun’s ghost and purify his guilt: 
     
    我愿意真有所谓鬼魂，真有所谓地狱，那么，即使在孽风怒吼之中，我也将寻
觅子君，当面说出我的悔恨和悲哀，祈求她的饶恕；否则，地狱的毒焰将围绕我
，猛烈地烧尽我的悔恨和悲哀。 
    我将在孽风和毒焰中拥抱子君，祈她宽容，或者使她快意…… 
I hope there are dead ghosts and spirits and there is a hell. There, buffeted by the 
infernal roars of retribution, I will seek out Zijun, tell her of my sorrow and regret, and 
beg her forgiveness; or the poisonous flames of the underworld will surround me and 
consume my sorrow and regret.  
Surrounded by infernal winds and poisonous flames, I shall take Zijun in my arms, and 
beg her to take mercy on me, or whatever she will… (133; Lovell 271) 
 
The narrative here almost takes on a lyrical quality in the sense that it is a pure expression of 
internal emotions and there is no sense of temporal movement or events unfolding that is vital 
to the construction of a narrative. In other words, the narrative stops at this point. The 
temporality of these utterances is a non-existing temporality; it cannot happen and will not 
happen except by being conjured up by the speaking subject’s imagination. The educated and 
enlightened narrator is willing to believe in afterlife so that he could confess his sorrow and 
regret directly to his dead wife. It is absolutely vital that he finds Zijun and is reunited with 
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her because the dead has to be conjured up to be present for his confession and grant him 
forgiveness. The act of conjuring the dead is to appease an angry ghost so that it can stop 
haunting him. The 否则 conjunction might indicate an alternative that seems punitive on the 
surface since he will be surrounded by poisonous flames if he did not obtain an acquittal from 
the dead. Yet the result of being surrounded by flames is not self-destruction but a relief from 
the sorrow and regret that have haunted and tortured him. In either case, his guilty conscience 
along with the haunting memory of the dead will be purified—the ultimate catharsis will be 
achieved.  
  Then the narrative ends in the temporal level of the writing present. The ending 
solely consists of sentences whose subject positions are occupied by the narrating “I”: 
   
 ……我活著，我總得向著新的生路跨出去，那第一步，—卻不過是寫下我
的悔恨和悲哀，為子君，為自己。 
  我仍然只有唱歌一般的哭聲，給子君送葬，葬在遺忘中。 
  我要遺忘；我為自己，並且要不再想到這用了遺忘給子君送葬。 
 我要向著新的生路跨進第一步去，我要將真實深深地藏在心的創傷中，默
默地前行，用遺忘和說謊做我的前導……。 
I am alive, and must make strides towards a new life. The first step is to write down my 
sorrow and regret for Zijun, and for myself.  
A dirge of funeral wails is all I have to bury Zijun with, to bury her in oblivion.  
I shall forget, for my own sake; I must stop thinking that I buried Zijun in oblivion.  
I must take the first strides towards a new life, burying the truth deep in the wound in 
my heart, silently advancing, and use forgetting and lying as my guide. (133; Lovell 
272)  
 
All the sentences that begin with “I” not only claim the personal agency for the “I” but also 
are speech acts that promise to do something and possibly already have, because this 
narrative is written under the guidance of lying and willful oblivion.36 It could be argued that 
                                                 
36 J. L. Austin, a philosopher of language, developed speech act theory in How to Do Things with Words. According to Austin, 
certain utterances such as “I hereby announce you husband and wife” are not constative but performative—we do something 
by uttering those words. The use of “I” is often necessary to validate and legitimize a performative utterance. Benveniste in 
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the entire text or the act of writing is a speech act that attempts to affirm the self, perform a 
therapeutic and exorcizing function, clear the guilty conscience of the narrating “I,” and set in 
motion the first step toward a new life devoid of the disturbing ghostly presence of the dead 
female Other.  
 Yet such an attempt to reaffirm a coherent and autonomous self, as this chapter has 
argued so far, has failed. The dead female Other, existing mainly as image and sound, 
constantly haunts the memory of the male narrator and permeates into the discourse as well 
as consciousness of the speaking subject “I.” The very fact that the narrating “I” as well as 
narrated “I” in another level of temporality feel the constant need to remind the writing “I” 
that he is still alive, to mention shenglu生路 numerous times, and to say that the “I” must 
live on as if he had to persuade himself to live on, attests to the fragility of his selfhood. In 
certain sense, they are both socially dead—it is Lu Xun’s poignant comment as well as deep 
skepticism about free love when there were no institutional backup or social acceptance at his 
time. However, Zijun literally dies and Juansheng lives. The text has thus, consciously or 
unconsciously, revealed the truth about the so-called modern sexual relationship in a 
patriarchal society that it is always the woman, as a “soiled good,” who has to pay the 
ultimate price—her life—for qing and sexual transgression. In the next chapter, we will 
witness a female writing subject being torn between her sexual desires and social norms. The 
self is more fragile and fragmented; her attempt to write the self into existence and struggle to 
maintain an autonomous self are more difficult. 
                                                                                                                                                        
his study of the unique linguistic quality of the first-person pronoun similarly pointed out that “I promise” and “he promises” 
have fundamental differences: “he promises” is purely a statement whereas “I promise” can be performative. See Benveniste 
“Nature of Pronouns” in Problems in General Linguistics.   
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CHAPTER III 
“CAN I TELL WHAT IT IS THAT I REALLY WANT?” THE FORMATION OF 
MULTIPLE AND UNINTELLIGIBLE SELVES IN DING LING’S “MISS SOPHIA’S 
DIARY” 
  “Miss Sophia’s Diary,” Ding Ling’s debut on literary stage in 1928, made her a 
nationally recognized figure.37 As one of the May Fourth writers appropriating “superior” 
Western literary form and content, narrative in particular, Ding Ling’s early style was 
characteristic of “a mixture of colloquial Chinese and more classical syntax” and was 
confined to urban bourgeois middle-class consumption (Barlow 6). Indebted to Flaubert’s 
Madame Bovary, themes like female sexuality, sexual repression, and the essence of 
femininity figured prominently in Ding Ling’s early writing.38 As Tani Barlow points out, 
Miss Sophia has long been interpreted as standing for “psychology of the modern girl” and as 
the epitome of New Woman (6). Existing scholarship, however, paid little attention to the 
formal and textual complexity of “Miss Sophia’s Diary.”39 Yi-tsi Mei Feuerwerker’s 
monograph on Ding Ling is probably the only work that offers substantial textual analysis of 
                                                 
37 For a detailed publication history of “Miss Sophia’s Diary” 莎菲女士的日記, see Tani E. Barlow’s “Introduction” in I 
Myself Am a Woman: Selected Writings of Ding Ling (1989). All the translations of the text are based on Barlow’s translation 
in I Myself Am a Woman with my slight alterations and revisions to bring out the more literal meanings of the original text. 
The original text used in the this paper is anthologized in Ding Ling duanpian xiaoshuoxuan丁玲短篇小說選, Hong Kong: 
Wenjiao chubanshe (1979). 
38 Barlow discusses in detail in the “Introduction” Ding Ling’s obsession with Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and its patent 
influence on her own work.  
39 Earlier scholarship often draws attention to the social and historical significance of the creation of Miss Sophia and 
attributes Miss Sophia’s tragic unhappiness and obfuscation to a social reality (traditional Confucianism deracinated and a 
new modern bourgeois subjectivity yet-to-be-formed) that failed to provide any care or guidance for women. For instance 
Amy Tak-yee Lai notes that female subjectivity in “Miss Sophia’s Diary” is split and her decision to give up diary writing at 
the end, i.e. silencing herself, is a result of “relatively conservative social background in the May Fourth period” (96). See 
also Yuan Liangjun “The Historical Significance and Archetypal Meaning of Miss Sophia” (1990) and Zhang Yongquan “A 
Woman in Search of Light in the midst of Darkness: A Reappraisal of the Image of Miss Sophia” (1984). Lydia H. Liu deems 
“Miss Sophia’s Diary” the key to the making of a “female literary tradition,” which she argues is a collective and historical 
endeavor by female writers and critics. Yet Liu never discusses the formal dimension of the text nor reads it holistically. See 
Liu, “Invention and Intervention: The Making of a Female Tradition in Modern Chinese Literature” in From May Fourth to 
June Fourth Fiction and Film in Twentieth-century China (1993). 
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“Miss Sophia’s Diary” in which she attends to certain formal dimensions of the text, such as 
narrative techniques. While building my reading of “Miss Sophia’s Diary” largely on hers 
and her view of self-writing as an attempt to render the self intelligible, I depart from 
Feuerwerker’s work to interrogate the use of “I” and the formal and generic characteristics of 
a diary that have not been discussed.40   
  This chapter attempts to explore the formal complexity of the diary narrative and 
believe that form, as a “historical practice in the social material process,” can bring the 
together aesthetic and social context (Williams 184).41 Thus I ask: Why a diary? What does it 
mean to use “I”? What kind of cultural function does the first-person singular “I” perform? 
And how does the narrative of a diary enable or impede the subject formation and 
construction of identity and subjectivity? In order to answer those questions and attend to the 
specific aesthetic features of the text, this chapter draws on the sociolinguistic theory on the 
intersubjective, social and performative nature of the “I,”42 existing discussions of formal 
features of the diary, and a poststructualist reading of autobiography as a figure that precedes 
and produces the self. It is my contention that the formal and generic multiplicity of the diary 
narrative written in first person perspective problematizes subject formation and attests to the 
difficulty and even impossibility of representing the self and rendering it intelligible. The 
                                                 
40 My reading is indebted to Feuerwerker’s insight that diary as a self-reflexive writing ends up “cast[ing] grave doubts on 
the intelligibility of the self, on the self as a source of meaning and authenticity” (49). Another existing scholarship that 
discusses first-person narratives from a linguistic perspective is the sixth chapter “The Deixis of Writing in the First Person” 
in Lydia H. Liu’s Translingual Practice. However even as Lydia Liu briefly evokes Emile Benveniste’s linguistic theory that 
it is through language that a subject is constituted, her consequent reading of “Miss Sophia’s Diary” focuses more on writing 
and reading as a gendered act and thus fails to fully engage with Benveniste’s theory and the function of a “I” discourse.  
41 For Raymond Williams, form is not devoid of social context but itself is a social relationship. See Williams, Marxism and 
Literature.  
42 As Lydia Liu points out in “The Deixis of Writing in the First Person” chapter, May Fourth writers consciously 
appropriated Indo-European languages, especially the use of pronouns that was not common or essential to Chinese language. 
Barlow similarly has noticed the conspicuous “Western-language sentence structure” in “Miss Sophia’s Diary” (50). Thus I 
am using sociolinguistic theories on inflected languages to apply to non-inflected Chinese without further justification. 
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formal and generic multiplicity produces a performative, fragmented and contradictory 
selfhood, which in turn resists any fixed subject position.  
The Performative and Social “I” 
  The French structural linguist, Emile Benveniste, in his classic chapter on “Subjectivity 
in Language” notes the reciprocity of the use of “I”: “I use I only when I am speaking to 
someone who will be a you in my address” (224), and the other becomes an echo to myself 
“to whom I say you and who say you to me” (225). Thus the old boundary between the self 
and the other in turn is bound to fall (225). Such a condition of intersubjectivity is what 
“makes linguistic communication possible” (230). Drawing on Benveniste, the French 
literary critic Michael Lucey notes the performative and social nature of the first person 
singular when discussing the (im)possibility of representing same-sex sexuality. According to 
Lucey, the first person “I” is a highly abstract figure that “successfully and intelligibly enacts 
social relations, keeps face, lays claims, and achieves recognition” (my emphasis 19). 
Further, “I” not only functions as a referential index that refers to the person saying “I” at that 
given moment, but also as a nonreferential index that points to a larger social context: the 
utterance of “I” takes some of its sense from the larger social universe in which it occurs 
(20).43 Informed by Benveniste’s and Lucey’s conceptualization of the first person singular, I 
analyze how the performative and social/relational nature of “I” plays out in “Miss Sophia’s 
Diary” and how it constructs the female identity and subjectivity. 
  Foremost, the “I” in “Miss Sophia,” despite its desire to be understood by the world, 
is performative and even deceitful. Miss Sophia finds no difficulty in lying to others, even 
                                                 
43 Here Lucey clearly echos another Benveniste’s essay “Nature of Pronouns” in which he elucidates that “I” is not 
referential in the sense that it does not point to a social reality but “can be only identified by the instance of discourse that 
contains it and be that alone” (218). 
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closest friends like Yunlin: “I’ve also deceived Yunlin as if telling lies were my instinct, and 
I exercised it effortlessly today” 並且在糊里糊塗中欺騙了雲霖，好像扯謊也是本能一樣
，所以在今天能毫不費力的便使用了。(January 1, 56). When with Ling Jishi, the man she 
desires, Miss Sophia constantly performs the role of a silent and submissive woman whose 
behavior befits the prescribed gender norms. Often Miss Sophia listens to Ling quietly even if 
she is filled with disagreement, hatred, and anger:  
 
So once again I yield to his shallow affection and listened while he talked animatedly 
about the stupid pleasure he enjoys so much, listened to him expound on his philosophy 
that making money and spending money sum up the meaning of life. I even acceded to 
his insinuation on the appropriate duty of being a woman. That made me despise him 
even more than before, and I cursed him and ridiculed him secretly, even as inwardly my 
fists struck painfully at my heart. 
於是我又很柔順地接受了他許多淺薄的情意，聽他說著那些使他津津回味的卑劣
享樂，以及“賺錢和化錢”的人生意義，並承他暗示我許多做女人的本分。這些
又使我看不起他，暗罵他，嘲笑他，我拿我的拳頭，隱隱痛擊我的心。 (March 21, 
71) 
 
There simultaneously exist an outwardly performative “I” conforming to gender norms and 
an inwardly more authentic (supposedly) “I” capable of criticizing the accumulative and 
consumptive ethos of capitalism and dominant gender ideology, who nevertheless has to 
internalize all those criticisms and dissents into self-afflicted pain. In the diary Miss Sophia is 
constantly oscillating between an external “I” and an internal “I.”  
 Further, the “I” in “Miss Sophia’s Diary” has a clear referential meaning, yet due to its 
abstract and figural nature it also points to a larger social context. On the surface, the title of 
the diary forecloses any referential ambiguity: “I” refers to “Miss Sophia,” pure and simple. 
However, as Barlow points out that a Western name is the mark of her “universal 
femininity,” and the name “Sophie” or “Sophia” alludes to Sophie of Rousseau’s Emile, who 
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is the “‘natural’ woman whose innate ‘female’ qualities became a textual reference in 
subsequent European philosophies of sexual essentialism” (26). I would further suggest that 
the universality and representability of Miss Sophia comes from the universal 
intersubjectivity of the first person singular “I”: anyone can use and become an “I” and thus 
makes the reader’s identification with the “I” significantly easier and more ready. Situated in 
the larger social context of 1920s China, when May Fourth intellectuals were endeavoring to 
characterize, define and encode a type of femininity to convey their political and didactic 
message, when breaking away from traditional family and free love were seen as act of free 
will that marked one’s identity as a modern man/woman, “I” Miss Sophia becomes a type 
through which all those ideals can be realized.44 It came as no surprise then that Miss Sophia 
has long been interpreted as an epitome of New Woman or Modern Girl.   
 Apart from bringing a larger social context into the meaning of “I,” the “I” is also 
intertwined with the immediate social environment in which it is situated. The beginning of 
the diary is marked by its very absence of an “I” subject; it only starts with a description of 
external force—the wind, and how it wakens the absent “I”: “The wind’s up again! Was 
wakened by the blowing wind before daylight. Then the boy came in to start the stove. I 
know I’ll never get back to sleep again” 今天又颳风！天还没亮，就被风颳醒了。伙計又
跑進来生火炉。我知道，这是怎樣都不能再睡得着了的。 (50). The “被” sentence 
pattern highlights the passivity of the subject and suggests the presence of an absent receiver. 
Even as the “I” occupies the subject position in the following sentence (“I know…”), the 
                                                 
44 Yue Ming-Bao points out that May Fourth literature on the one hand often recounts the tragic fate of lower-class and 
uneducated women to launch their scathing critique of a repressive traditional society, and depicts educated and modern 
women (New Women) to indicate the future of the nation on the other. In either case, women are always being represented 
and silenced even though they figure prominently in the narrative. See Yue “Gendering the Origins of Modern Chinese 
Fiction” in Gender and Sexuality in Twentieth-Century Chinese Literature and Society (1993). 
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content of its knowledge, far from being a claim to truth or of significance, is about 
something extremely trivial and personal—her inability to fall asleep again; thus the subject 
being formed here is an extremely weak one. Throughout the first diary entry, the “I” is 
always on the receiving end of and annoyed by outside intrusions, such as wind, cold 
weather, and the noise from the hall, permeating into the private domestic space she 
endeavors to maintain. Such a porous domestic space suggests the impossibility to maintain a 
sense of self-contained “I” devoid of external disruptions.  
  The relational nature of the “I” is rendered more obvious when positioned in relation to 
others in the society and enacting a set of social relations that put her in a centered, superior 
position. The effeminate Weidi brings her sustenance such as eggs that are vital to the invalid 
“I;” he alleviates her suffocating loneliness while he becomes the source of her sadistic 
pleasure: 
 
When this honest, open man was there, I used all the cruelty of my nature to make him 
suffer. Yet once he’d left, there was nothing I wanted more than to snatch him back and 
plead with him: “I know I was guilty. Don’t love a woman so unworthy of your affection 
as I am!”  
在一個老實人面前，我已盡自己的殘酷天性去磨折他，但當他走後，我真想能抓
回他來，只請求他：“我知道自己的罪過，請不要再愛這樣一個不配承受那真摯
的愛的女人了吧！” (54) 
 
Miss Sophia is repetitively torn between a sadistic pleasure and masochistic guilt afterwards. 
Both the pleasure and guilt are derived from the pains she afflicts on an emasculated man, 
which puts her in an unequal power relation with Weidi since her guilt later translates into 
emotional rewards for Weidi. In other words no matter guilty or not, she has absolute control 
over Weidi’s behavior.  
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  After encountering Ling Jishi, a wealthy young man from Singapore, Miss Sophia 
expresses even more intense desire to control and possess: “I want to possess him. I want 
unconditional surrender of his heart. I want him kneeling down in front of me, begging me to 
kiss him.” 我要佔有他，我要他無條件的獻上他的心，跪著求我賜給他的吻呢。 (59). 
The “I” occupies absolute subject position in three paralleled sentences and enacts action as 
well as desire. To control, to possess a man as an object means her resistance to being 
controlled, possessed and objectified. On the contrary, Miss Sophia constantly fantasizes, 
objectifies and fetishizes Ling Jishi. Lydia Liu observes in the text a reversal of desiring 
subject (male) and the object of desire (female) in which the gaze of the female narrator 
“turns the man into a sex object, reversing male discourse about desire” (“Invention” 201). 
The body of Ling Jishi under Sophia’s gaze is always in fragmentation: lips, eyes, face, hair, 
etc. His body parts, his tall and slim body, his red lips, his enchanting eyes, his rosy face, and 
his soft hair are repeatedly depicted in the diary as if Lin is devoid of subjectivity (59, 62, 
79). Such an inverted gender role is a highly transgressive one.   
  The “I” in “Miss Sophia’s Diary” thus cannot reach its ontological meaning without 
the existence of a performative self, the social other (to be subjected, objectified and 
possessed), and a larger social context. Its very contingency on social relations and context 
renders any self-containment impossible even in a first-person writing, a privileged site to 
construct, define and describe a self. In the next part, I turn to such difficulty of narrating the 
self and maintaining an intact/autonomous self.  
The Fragmentation and Unintelligibility of the Self 
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  Diary, as a form of first-person writing, not only gives the reader relatively unmediated 
access (compared with a third-person narration) to the interiority of the writer, but also as 
Paperno points out, enables the author to “describe and define” him/herself through an 
“unmediated position of the speaking subject” (2).45 Furthermore, a diary, as a daily 
accounting of internal thoughts and external actions of the self, has a temporal aspect; this 
temporal aspect is vital to the construction of a self: a Kantian self needs succession and 
continuity to unfold and form in time (Paperno 18). The relatively unmediated and temporal 
nature of a diary naturally makes it an optimal form of writing to narrate the self. However, in 
“Miss Sophia’s Diary,” even if the writing narrator narrates herself from a seemingly 
unmediated position of speaking subject and the reader is guaranteed a relatively unmediated 
access to the most inner and private thoughts of Miss Sophia, the narrated self is split and 
fragmented. It remains a self unintelligible to Sophia herself, to others in the story and to the 
reader; it can only reach the destination of self-effacement because an imminent death 
approaches.  
  Due to the formal similarities between diary and autobiography (both in the first-
person modes), I find Paul de Man’s contention that autobiographical writing precedes and 
produces the life of the writer and not the opposite particularly useful: “the autobiographical 
project may itself produce and determine the life” (69). As de Man nicely puts it, the writing 
of oneself, or “the technical demands of self-portraiture” may well be governed and 
determined by “the resources of his medium” (69). In other words, language as a medium and 
autobiographical writing as a form govern and determine the formation of the writing/written 
                                                 
45 Paperno in another article that discusses the formal distinctions of diaries as a genre points out that many scholars have 
noted the private and confessional nature of diary. See Paperno, “What Can Be Done with Diary?” (2004). 
 43 
 
self. In the last part of the paper, I attempt to analyze how the formal multiplicity of this diary 
produces a fragmented and unintelligible self and how it complicates subject formation and 
eventually erases the subject. 
  First of all, the split and fragmented self of Miss Sophia is produced by various 
addresses to herself. Throughout the narrative Miss Sophia continuously addresses herself in 
third person as if her self were an object to be analyzed and studied. As she self-objectifies, 
“my life is nothing but my own plaything” (我的生命只是我自己的玩品) (March 28, 80). 
When “I” and “Sophia” appear in the same sentence, the sense of estrangement and alienation 
becomes even more conspicuous: “I have nothing further to say on the subject of friends. I 
only know that Sophia will never find satisfaction in ordinary friendship” 關於朋友，我不
說了。我知道永世也不會使莎菲感到滿足這人間的友誼的！(March 27, 77). Who’s this 
“I” if not Sophia? Even the “I” refers to Sophia in such given context, it also enacts a distance 
and split relation between one self “I” and another third-person self “Sophia.” “Sophia” thus 
splits from the writing subject and becomes an external object to be addressed and analyzed. 
  However when addressing herself in second person as Sophia does at the end of the 
diary, the narrative turns into a lyric address: “I laughed wildly and pitied myself: ‘Live 
quietly and die quietly. Ah, I pity you, Sophia!’” 我狂笑的憐惜自己：“悄悄的活下来，悄
悄的死去，啊！我可憐你，莎菲!” (March 28, 81). The “I/you” pronouns here establish a 
relationship between the self and the other whose boundary as Benveniste’s points out is 
indeed fragile; the distance between “I” and “you” is indeed shorter than addressing someone 
in third person. Further, as Jonathan Culler in Theory of the Lyric has theorized the non-
linear, non-teleological nature of the temporality in the lyric as opposed to narrative, to 
 44 
 
apostrophize something is “to locate them in the time of the apostrophe” (225). The addressee 
is in turn animated and preserved as forever present in the instance of the utterance (Culler 
226). Here “Sophia” as a “you” enters an intersubjective relationship with the self as an “I,” 
and thus multiple selves are produced by the lyric address as well as rendered forever alive 
and present by the lyric address. It simultaneously deprives the subject of its life as she is 
going to die soon while preserving the subject in an utterance.  
  This fragmentation and alienation of the self becomes more dramatized when Sophia 
interacts with other people in society. Sophia constantly complains that people around her do 
not understand her; she wants to maintain her sense of an autonomous self yet cares deeply 
about how others perceive her:  
 
I am the only person who can pardon what I did. They all criticize me, but they don’t 
know the feelings I endure when I am with other people. People say I am eccentric, but 
no one notices how often I’m willing to toady for affection and approval. No one will 
ever encourage me to say things that contradict my real thoughts. They endure my 
eccentricities constantly, which gives me even ore cause to reflect on my behavior, and 
that ends up distancing me even further from them.  
除了我自己，沒有人會原諒我的。誰也在批評我，誰也不知道我在人前所忍受的
一些人們給我的感觸。別人說我怪僻，他們哪裡知道我卻時常在討人好，討人歡
喜。不過人們太不肯鼓勵我說那太違心的話，常常給我機會，讓我反省我自己的
行為，讓我離人們卻更遠了。(December 24, 53) 
 
What is striking in terms of part of speech is that all the wos here are unanimously objects. In 
other words, Sophia becomes an “I” wo as “me,” as an object not subject or agent. Her 
passivity is further marked by her willingness and attempts to please people that only result in 
her further alienation from them. In her interactions with other people, Sophia develops a 
double consciousness in which she always see herself through others’ eyes.46 The words and 
                                                 
46 I am evoking W. E. B. Du Bois’s conceptualization of double consciousness in The Souls of Black Folks here. A double 
consciousness is developed when one is “looking at oneself through the eyes of others” (Du Bois 68). Du Bois’s double 
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opinion of others impose a determining influence on the discourse and consciousness of 
Sophia. As argued in my previous chapter, a seemingly solipsistic first-person narrative is in 
fact dialogized or double-voiced. The confessional nature of diary allows us a vantage point 
to witness the formation of such conflicting double consciousness.   
  Throughout the narrative, Miss Sophia always sees herself through the eyes of others 
and develops a new knowledge of herself based on others’ perception of her. In the passage 
quoted above, guaipi “eccentric,” a term given to her by other people around her, becomes 
part of her perception of herself and how she conducts her behaviors accordingly. Sophia in 
particular is eager to learn how Ling Jishi sees her: “This uncertainty makes me want to see 
him again, to examine how this tall and strange creature sees me” 這又使我只想再見他一面
，到底審看一下這高大的怪物是怎樣的在觀看我。 (70). Upon their first encounter, under 
the gaze of Lin, Sophia feels extremely ashamed of her “ragged slippers” and dares not to go 
into the lighted area—a feeling that has never occurred to her. Frustrated with her restrained 
and boring manner, she suddenly develops a new perspective on her self: “Today I found out 
how moronic and graceless I could seem to be” “今天才知道自己是還只能顯得又呆，又
傻氣。 (January 1, 55). Sophia here develops a double consciousness and acquires a new 
knowledge of herself when sees herself through the eyes of her superior male counterpart. 
  The diary narrative thus is locked in a perpetuating battle between establishing the self 
as source of knowledge and authority and others’ perception and knowledge on her. The verb 
“知道” appears numerous times in the text, and often in the form of “我知道” (I know…) 
                                                                                                                                                        
consciousness specifically refers to Black people being forced to view themselves through white perspectives while 
endeavoring to maintain their own identities and self-definitions—two coexisting and irreconcilable identities. Such racial 
double consciousness resembles Miss Sophia’s gendered double consciousness because in both cases the inferior party 
positioned in an unequal power relation sees oneself through the eyes of the superior counterpart and thus develops a self-
consciousness based on others’ perception of oneself. 
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and sometimes “誰也/他们不知道” (nobody knows/they don’t know…). In premodern 
Chinese literary culture, the intelligibility of the self was very much tied up to being socially 
recognizable to others. For instance, poetry, centered on the writing and expression of the 
self, was supposed to render the self intelligible to oneself and to others in a community that 
consists of poets, as encapsulated in the axiom “詩言志” (poetry expresses aspiration). Zhi  
(aspiration) in the premodern context and zhidao in this text have clear resonance. 47 It could 
be argued that Sophia engages in similar process of creating self-expression that might render 
her aspiration (zhi) as well as herself intelligible. Yet because Sophia’s self is no longer the 
sole source of self-knowledge but split, fragmented, and contingent upon others, she fails to 
articulate her zhi and construct a social identity recognizable and intelligible to others through 
the act of writing. 
  Such a split, fragmented, and contingent self only results in confusion and further 
unintelligibility. Sophia cannot be understood by others precisely because she cannot 
understand or articulate what she wants or aspire to. She ends up endlessly interrogating 
herself “Can I say what it is I really want?” 我能说得出我真实的需要是些什么呢? 
(January 3), later “But then what is the point of after all? This is really hard to say!” 我到底
又为了什么呢，这真难说! March 13), and toward the end “Recently I’ve had more 
difficulty understanding what I’m anxious for” 近來呢，我更不知為了什麼只能焦急。” 
(March 21, Evening). When she discloses her diary to Weidi, hoping that it could explain 
herself to him, yet it has only resulted in Weidi’s continual misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of her. The same text therefore has produced two different meanings when 
                                                 
47 My special thanks should be given to Prof. Maram Epstein for pointing out the prominence of the verb “知道” in this text 
and its relation to traditional notions of “志.”  
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addressing to herself and addressing to Weidi.48 Despite her constant complaints about the 
world’s failure to understand herself, disclosure of her most inner thoughts does little help to 
render the self intelligible. Indeed as de Man points out, autobiography, and in this case a 
diary, hardly offers “reliable self-knowledge” but reveals “the impossibility of coming into 
being” through a textual system (71).  
  Sophia’s split and unintelligible self also derives from a subject position that speaks 
and internalizes the language of dominant gender ideology, continuously measuring her 
behavior against prescribed gender norms, and a subject position that rejects those 
ideologies.49 Sophia is highly aware of the social norms imposed on women and on how they 
should behave: “A woman that uninhibited would risk having everything blow up in her face” 
一个女人这样放肆，是不会得好结果的。 (January 4, 57); “I have decided; I regret, regret 
that the wrong doings I did today—things a respectable woman could never do” 我决定了，
我懊悔，懊悔我白天所做的一些不是，一个正经女人所做不出来的。 (January 5, 75). 
She has to suppress her sexual desire for Ling because it is prohibited by society: “I know 
very well that in this society I’m forbidden to take what I need to gratify my desires and 
frustrations, even when it clearly wouldn’t hurt anybody” (55). Instead she “lowers [her] head 
patiently and quietly read the name printed on the card…” (my emphasis 55). In other words, 
she conforms to socially constructed norms such as patriarchal gender codes of Confucianism 
that discipline female bodies and prescribe women’s silence, chastity and subservience. Even 
                                                 
48 It is worth noting that the only person who seems to understand Sophia is Sister Yun, a friend/lover figure for her. Many 
critics have noticed the homosocial bonding between Sophia and Sister Yun. Lydia Liu specifically foregrounds female 
bonding as a site of resistance to patriarchal power in her reading of “Miss Sophia’s Diary” and in the works of many other 
female writers. See Liu “Invention and Intervention” and chapter six in Translingual Practice.   
49 I agree with Yi-tsi Mei’s reading that Sophia is never fully emancipated from “traditional institutionalized modes of 
womanly behavior” but internalizes them, resulting in a continual war with oneself (44). 
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if Miss Sophia is an educated modern woman, the power of social norms penetrates her 
discourse and interpellates her into a conforming subject.50  
 On the other hand, Sophia refuses to conform to certain norms and attempts to establish 
the self as the ultimate source of authority (“only I can know myself”) by rejecting any form 
of institutional affiliation. No matter marriage or family—the two primary and probably the 
sole institutional affiliations accessible to women at that time—is rejected by Miss Sophia, 
yet such rejection only results in her self-effacement. Even though Sophia cannot articulate 
what she wants, she articulates what she does not want clearly: not marriage, not family, not 
money, not status (March 28, 79). Structurally excluded from the dominant society, i.e. a 
patriarchal society, in terms of economic structure, familial structure and institutional 
structure, women in a Confucian society could only assume a position of subordination, as 
expounded by the “Three Obediences” and “Four Virtues.” This still stands true in a post-
Confucian China such as the May Fourth period. Renouncing any forms of affiliation, be it 
family or marriage, Sophia negates her own existence as well: she simply cannot exist in a 
society whose structure has no place for a woman like Sophia. The self in the diary reaches 
an ontological impasse in which the narrative is going nowhere, nothing gets resolved and 
Sophia will “die quietly” (last entry, 81).  
                                                 
50 Here I’m evoking Louis Althusser’s concept of ideology and its power to interpellate an individual into subjects in 
“Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus.” Althusser's famous analogy for understanding the individual's interpellation 
is that of a person walking down the street when a policeman yells, "Hey You!" Within the action of turning around, the 
individual has become hailed into the law because the individual has recognized that call, turned, and thus is willingly 
subject to the ideology of law. According to Althusser, the subject is always already initiated into subordination to the ruling 
ideology both through the Repressive State Apparatus (such as army, police, prison, etc.) and through the Ideological State 
Apparatus (such as schools, education, church, etc.) that works in more subtle ways and creates a freely submitting subject. 
Ideological State Apparatus, school and education system in particular ensures the reproduction of labor power, for it not 
only imparts skills that would prepare the man for future work and labor market, but also inculcates ruling ideology and 
ensures submission to such ideology.  
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  The self, whether a performative first-person singular “I,” an objectified “me” or third-
person “Sophia,” can only exist in relation to others and cannot exist when it rejects all forms 
of institutional affiliations. In its formal multiplicity, in its own construction of identity 
through the eyes of others as well as through dominant ideology, in its resistance to 
institutional and social affiliations, in its rejection to be interpellated into any fixed subject 
position, there can only exist double or even multiple selves, fragmented and unintelligible. 
The diary, a presumably optimal site to define and describe the self, on the one hand produces 
and preserves selfhood, and on the other attests to the very difficulty of narrating and 
constructing an intact and autonomous self devoid of the materiality of social relations and 
affiliations. Especially when the material conditions of a Chinese society in the 1920s failed 
to accommodate the existence of “quasi-liberated” women like Sophia, it only resulted in an 
aporia of narrative and ontological impasse. The diary, as an attempt to write oneself into 
existence, only becomes a testament of her existence before she dies quietly; the “I” in written 
utterances, like the signature, marks the absence of the writer Miss Sophia and only attests to 
her “having-been-present in a past” (Derrida 107).  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A REVOLUTIONARY SELF 
  As Feuerwerker rightly observes, the narrative impasse reached at the end of “Miss 
Sophia’s Diary” encapsulated the limit of such a self-confining subjective form of writing 
(1982, 76). The realization of such limit led to Ding Ling’s eventual abandonment of this 
form of writing and the bourgeois individualist ideology underlying it, and to her conversion 
to a Marxist ideology in the 1930s. Lu Xun’s shift to the left toward the end of his life seemed 
also to bespeak his disillusionment with a bourgeois individualism; his giving up of fiction 
writing altogether reflected an even deeper disillusionment with a mode of literary 
representation that relies on the mediation of social reality. These two writers’ change of 
intellectual stance was again representative of the shift in larger intellectual context of their 
time, or as Marston Anderson puts it, “reflect[ed] the general trend toward collectivism 
among intellectuals in post-May Fourth China” (1993, 257).  
  Their attempt to textually construct a bounded, coherent and autonomous self modeled 
on Western Enlightenment notions of the self failed; the aspirational modern self remained 
forever aspirational and never quite realized. As the close readings of the two texts have 
shown, the formal and generic complexities of the texts in fact stand in the way of or even 
betray that construction, and instead those complexities produce selves that are multiple, 
fragile, fragmented, under the threat of death (of self and other), and sometimes unintelligible.  
  This reading does not so much confirm a poststructuralist belief in the limits of 
language and discursive production as point to a more significant revelation that the social 
reality of China at that time foreclosed the possibility of textually creating an aspirational 
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modern self. Juansheng and Zijun’s pursuit of free love leads to their social exclusion as well 
as loss of economic means of survival; Miss Sophia’s rejection of traditional forms of 
social/institutional affiliations and value systems results in her failure to construct an 
intelligible social identity and thus failure to write the self into existence. After all, as Adorno 
states, “works of art that react against empirical reality obey the forces of that reality” (190). 
The fragmented, split, and fragile self is the negotiated result of the encountering between the 
concept of a bordered, coherent and autonomous self and a social reality that lacked the 
material base for the existence of such a self.  
  As mentioned before, many intellectuals abandoned this concept of the self and took a 
more collective approach to thinking about the self and subjectivity after the May Fourth. 
Soon a new type of the self, a different model of conceiving the self and subjectivity would 
emerge and take over. It culminated in the socialist era in the 1950s, and the Diary of Lei 
Feng was its paradigmatic manifestation. While the authenticity of the Diary of Lei Feng 
remains questionable, as Wendy Larson eloquently argues in her comparative study of diary 
of Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, a faithful disciple of Freud, and Lei Feng’s diary, the assumption 
that autobiographical writing such as diary will reveal an authentic inner self should be 
questioned.51 This is because diary writers can easily manipulate the form, and for diaries that 
were written under heavy influence of ideological imperatives, in this case Freud’s theories 
and Maoism, it might be more productive to read them as “windows into ideological 
constructs” (Larson 2011, 178). 
                                                 
51 Hermine Hug-Hellmuth (1871-1924) was psychoanalyst and a disciple of Freud. According to Wendy Larson, most of her 
contemporary psychoanalysts attributed A Young Girl’s Diary that was allegedly written by a patient of hers to Hug-Hellmuth 
because the young girl was never identified. Given Hug-Hellmuth’s “‘obstinate’ adherence” to Freud’s theories, Larson 
rightly points out that we should interpret the diary as a fictional creation and the young girl a literary persona created by 
Hug-Hellmuth based on Freud’s theories on the self and subjectivity. See Larson, “The Freudian Subject and the Maoist 
Mind: The Diaries of Hermine Hug-Hellmuth and Lei Feng,” Psychoanalysis and History 13.2 (2011). 
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  The Diary of Lei Feng does offer us a picture of the ideal embodiment of what a Maoist 
revolutionary self with a revolutionary mind looks like. According to Larson, the Freudian 
sexualized unconscious and the Chinese revolutionary spirit are two different models of 
conceptualizing the self and subjectivity, and the former should not impose its quasi-claim to 
universality to the latter.52 The Chinese revolutionary mind is defined “through passionate 
intellectual and emotional embodiment of social context and position” (Larson 2011, 158); a 
revolutionary self is properly positioned in relation to power (Larson 2009, 79); a 
revolutionary subjectivity is “in complete sync with the material and social reality” (Larson 
2011, 175). The transition between the subjective, the social, and the material is thus 
seamless.  
  In the following passage, we will witness the formation of the revolutionary “I” that is 
properly positioned and in perfect sync with the social reality: 
 
        我出身在一个很贫穷的农民家庭，在旧社会受尽了折磨和痛苦，在慈祥的母
亲中国共产党的不断哺育和教导下，居然成为了一个国防军战士、光荣的共产党
员，我要时刻准备着为党和阶级的最高利益，牺牲个人的一切，直至生命。 
I was born in an extremely poor peasant family. I suffered endless tortures and pains in 
the old society. Yet under the nurture and guidance of the loving Mother, the Chinese 
Communist Party, I became a soldier in the national defense and an honorable 
Communist Party member. I must be prepared at all times to sacrifice everything of 
myself for the ultimate interests of the Party and class until my last breath. (December 
27, 1960) 
 
This short passage constructs a narrative of the teleological development of the ideologically 
charged “I”—from a poor peasant child to a soldier and Party member. This is also a narrative 
that fits into the Party-state’s official narrative of a history divided into pre-liberation 
                                                 
52 See also Larson, From Ah Q to Lei Feng: Freud and Revolutionary Spirit in 20th Century China (2009). 
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bitterness and suffering and a post-liberation prosperity and happiness. In other words, Lei 
Feng’s sense of the self and construction of his personal history is in line with an official 
discourse on how history should be narrated and constructed. While there is a clear distinction 
between the temporality of the past and the temporality of the present, the present and the 
future temporality are connected and enclosed by the narrating “I”’s forever readiness to 
sacrifice the self for the Party representing a greater good and higher end. Lei Feng thus 
comes to embody Mao’s idea of a “permanent revolution.” Unlike Miss Sophia whose zhi 
(intention) and social identity are unintelligible, the narrating “I” finds meaning in his identity 
as a soldier and Communist Party member, and in turn those socially recognizable identities 
had rendered Lei Feng intelligible as well as emulatable to millions readers from the 1950s. 
This revolutionary self occupies a subject position that has been successfully interpellated by 
the dominant ideology, properly positioned to power represented by the Party, and completely 
embedded in the collective social. 
  But one may argue that Lei Feng, as a possibly fabricated person and an ideological 
construct, may have little bearing on how people living in the 1950s actually conceived the 
self and came to inhabit a subject position. One may question if this model of conceptualizing 
the self and subjectivity were operating in the minds of actual people. Then the historian Gail 
Hershatter’s study of the life stories of women labor models from the 1950s confirms the 
validity of this different model.53 Based on the analysis of the interviews conducted with 
female labor models from the 1950s, Hershatter draws the following conclusion: 
“[E]mergence as a labor model, with its accompanying public activities, profoundly shaped 
                                                 
53  For more detailed and systematic study of rural women’s experience of the revolution and collectivization, see Hershatter, 
The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China’s Collective Past (2013). 
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these women’s sense of who they were and their memories of that time. … [W]omen recalling 
their past as labor models do so in language provided by the historical process they are 
recalling” (50). In other words, their identity and subjectivity cannot be separated from the 
state discourse and political movement. Hershatter further suggests that this find calls into 
question the very existence of interiority as well as the assumption that underneath the surface 
there is always an authentic and private self “apart from or in resistance to state 
discourse”(50).  
  In a similar vein, it is my hope that through my discussion of different models of 
conceptualizing the self, including the Western Enlightenment epistemology of the self, we’ve 
come to see the self and subjectivity as discursively and ideologically constructed. A concept 
of the self, such as possessive individualism that has been taken to be universal, in fact has a 
history and thus is always contingent and particular. A possessive and private self is no more 
universal than a relational and collective self; a revolutionary mind is no more particular than 
the Freudian unconscious.  
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